Shapley and scarf 1974
WebbShapley and Scarf (1974): Housing market. A housing market is ((a k,h k) k=1,..,n,˜) such that 1. fa 1,..,a ngis a set of agents and fh 1,..,h ngis a set of houses, where agent a k owns house h k. 2.Each agent a has strict preferences ˜ a over houses. A matching m is a function specifying who gets what good: m(a) is the house that agent a ... WebbCited by 199 - Google Scholar @Article{shapley74a, author = {Lloyd Shapley and Herbert Scarf}, title = {On cores and indivisibility}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = 1974, volume = 1, number = 1, pages = {23--37}, abstract = {An economic model of trading in commodities that are inherently indivisible, like houses, is investigated from a …
Shapley and scarf 1974
Did you know?
Webb16 juni 2013 · The same model, but with strict preferences, goes back to the seminal work of Shapley and Scarf in 1974. When preferences are strict, we now know that the Top-Trading Cycles (TTC) ... Webbtions. The literature on the indivisible allocation problem was initiated by Shapley and Scarf (1974), who formulated as the "housing problem" and gave an abstract characterization …
Webb21 maj 2010 · This paper considers the object allocation problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (J Math Econ 1:23–37, 1974). We study secure implementation (Saijo et al. in Theor Econ 2:203–229, 2007), that is, double implementation in dominant strategy and Nash equilibria. We prove that (1) an individually rational solution is securely … Webb20 juli 2000 · We study a generalization of Shapley-Scarf’s (1974) economy in which multiple types of indivisible goods are traded. We show that many of the distinctive …
Webb5 mars 2024 · The barter market of Shapley and Scarf ( 1974) stands out as a celebrated model in the fields of microeconomics and cooperative game theory. The top trading cycle (TTC) procedure described in their paper has found important applications in mechanism design, two-sided matching, kidney exchange, and school choice, etc. WebbL. Shapley, H. Scarf Published 1 March 1974 Economics Journal of Mathematical Economics View via Publisher web.archive.org Save to Library Create Alert Cite Figures from this paper figure 3 figure I 1,299 …
WebbUp to now we have followed the description of a classical Shapley-Scarf housing market model as introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). Now, in contrast with that model, we assume that each agent cares not only about the house he receives but also about the recipient of his own house. That is, preferences capture limited externalities that are
http://fmwww.bc.edu/ec-p/wp484.pdf flusholWebb1 maj 2024 · We consider two variants of Shapley and Scarf’s (1974) housing market model in which agents’ rights to consume own endowments are restricted but their … flush novalginflush nicotine fastWebb1 feb. 2002 · Abstract We study house allocation problems introduced by L. Shapley and H. Scarf (1974, J. Math. Econ.1, 23–28). We prove that a mechanism (a social choice … greengage summer authorWebb1 mars 1994 · We study strategy-proof and fair mechanism in Shapley and Scarf (1974) economies. We introduce a new condition for fairness, we call envy-freeness for equal position. It requires that if one agent… Expand 2 PDF Strategy-Proofness and the Core in House Allocation Problems E. Miyagawa Economics Games Econ. Behav. 2002 TLDR flush nippersWebbWe study a generalization of Shapley-Scarf's (1974) economy in which multiple types of indivisible goods are traded. We show that many of the distinctive results from the … greengage solutionsWebbEach market in this circulation model is a generalized Shapley-Scarf market (Shapley and Scarf, 1974), where agents are endowed with multiple units of an indivisible and agent-specific good. ... For classical Shapley-Scarf markets, where each agent is endowed with one unit of her good, one exchange rule stands flush non flushable wipes